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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Imperial mis-states the standard of review on appeal, by arguing that Niemela needed 
to "marshall the evidence". The usual summary judgment standard of review applies. For 
summary judgment purposes, regulatory compliance does not heighten the standard, which 
is that all genuine issues of material fact go to the fact-finder. At trial, the fact of regulatory 
compliance is considered in determining whether the product was defective. But at the 
summary judgment stage, if there is any evidence to support a finding of defectiveness, then 
the case should not be dismissed without trial. 
Niemela clearly described a defective product, both in design and manufacture. The 
Imperial mailbox had a knob that was too small, too shallow in depth, and insufficient 
weight. The mailbox was constructed with holes and gaps that allowed rain and snow to bind 
or freeze the hinge points. Due to the repetitive nature of Niemela's mail route, consisting 
of over 600 Imperial mailboxes, it was only a matter of time before her hand gave out, which 
it did. The trial court erred in deciding that Niemela had alleged no duty on Imperial to stop 
selling these mailboxes, or to warn consumers who had already purchased them. It erred in 
deciding that there was no evidence of defect in the mailboxes, by completely disregarding 
Niemela's testimony. It erred in believing that Niemela's testimony did not rebut the 
presumption of safety from compliance with federal regulations. 
Imperial should not be allowed to raise a new argument on appeal, that Niemela 
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! 
cannot show medical causation. This requires a factual record, which was not developed 
because it was not raised below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
NIEMELA HAS NO DUTY TO "MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE" 
Imperial argues that "The Trial Court's factual findings cannot be challenged because 
Niemela has failed to properly marshal all the evidence." Imperial misunderstands; Niemela 
has no duty to "marshall the evidence". The trial court decided the case on summary 
judgment. The appellate court "give[s] the [trial] court's legal decisions no deference, 
reviewing for correctness, while reviewing the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of 
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, If 15, 13 P.3d 581." Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, ^44; 
232 P.3d 1059, 1070 (Utah 2010). It is only after trial of the case, when facts are "found", 
that the marshalling the evidence requirement arises. See Paster, Gould, Ames & Weaver, 
Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872 fn. 1 (Utah App. 1994)("On appeal from a bench trial, we view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, and recite the facts 
accordingly. Lake Philgas Serv. v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951, 953 n. 1 (Utah App. 1993)"). 
This is because the trial court, after a bench trial, has had the opportunity to view witnesses 
in a manner that the appellate courts do not. As the Utah Supreme Court recently explained: 
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"A trial court decides [summary judgment] on the basis of a cold paper record. Since the trial 
court has no comparative advantage over the appellate court in resolving these questions, the 
appellate court reviews a summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's decision, (footnotes omitted)". Bahr v. Imus, 2011UT19,20090646 (UTSC), 1f 12-18. 
The case of Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004) cited by 
Imperial, was an appellate review of the granting of injunctive relief, after a plenary 
evidentiary hearing, with the trial court sitting as the finder of fact. In this case, Imperial has 
asked that a jury hear the evidence and act as the finder of fact. This is in complete accord 
with the Bahr case, supra. Because the trial court here did not hear evidence, Niemela's 
claims should be reviewed de novo, 
POINT TWO 
NIEMELA'S TESTIMONY ABOUT THE DEFECTS IN THE IMPERIAL 
MAILBOX SET FORTH MATERIAL FACTS WHICH A JURY COULD 
CONCLUDE REBUTTED ANY PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM 
COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 
Regardless of which set of regulations applies, either the 1992 or the 2001 regulations, 
compliance with regulations only creates a presumption that a product is not defective. 
Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc., 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007). Due to the date of this 
case, this is a common law presumption, rather than a statutory presumption. Egbert v. 
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 2010 UT 8, 228 P.3d 737 (Utah 2010). 
The evidence recited by Niemela is sufficient to create a jury question whether the 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mailbox was defective, either in design or manufacture. Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 
176 P.2d 118 (Utah 1947)(error to remove case from jury, whether defendant employer 
rebutted presumption of negligence). While the burden of proof remains with Niemela, the 
fact of regulatory compliance is simply evidence from which the jury can conclude non-
defectiveness. It does not create a safe harbor provision, where compliance precludes 
liability. See Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 301-303; 300 P.2d 642, 650 (Utah 
1956)(presumption of survival may be rebutted with "some evidence" to the contrary); 
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994)(factual question 
for trial whether employee rebutted presumption of at-will employment);The Cantamar, 
LLC v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, 142 P.3d 140 (Utah App. 2006)(summary 
judgment reversed where there was evidence to rebut presumption of integration of contract). 
The litany of problems posed by the small knob Imperial mailbox is sufficient to 
create an issue of fact as to defective design. "Defective" means "dangerous to an extent 
beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary and prudent. . . user of that product 
in that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and 
uses.. .".U.C.A. §78-15-6(2)(1977).Niemelaneedonlypersuadeajury,by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the small knob Imperial mailbox was defective. Egbert v. Nissan North 
America, Inc., 167 P.3d 1058, 1062; 2007 UT 64, ^14-17. The list of problems includes: 
1) knob diameter too small 
-4-
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2) knob depth too shallow 
3) holes in top of mailbox not sealed to prevent water intrusion and ice buildup at 
hinge 
4) exposed joint between door and box allows direct entry of water to form ice 
These problems result in a mailbox that is "dangerous to an extent beyond which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent. . . user". This point is highlighted by the stark 
difference between the Imperial mailbox in question and the Imperial mailbox with the 
larger, deeper knob. It is also highlighted by the difference between the Imperial mailbox in 
question and the ordinary aluminum mailboxes. Neither of these other designs created any 
problem for Niemela in delivery. 
Imperial argues that "the [tjrial [cjourt correctly concluded that the 1992 Model 
Mailboxes were free from defect or defective condition". Imperial Brief, p. 11. This is a jury 
question, however. Imperial argues that the only evidence that the Imperial mailboxes were 
defective was the 2001 regulations. This is not correct. Niemela has testified in detail about 
the defects in the mailboxes. Whether analyzed under the 1992 standards or the 2001 
standards, Niemela's testimony stands in rebuttal to any presumption, and created a jury 
question whether the mailboxes were defective. This was a jury question, not one for the 
judge to "find". 
-5-
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POINT THREE 
IMPERIAL INCORRECTLY FRAMES THIS CASE IN TERMS OF 
"DUTY" RATHER THAN "NEGLIGENCE" 
Imperial argues that it owed no duty to Niemela regarding a "non-defective 1992 
Model Mailbox". Imperial Brief, p. 13-14. This is a confusing mischaracterization of 
Niemela's lawsuit. Niemela had alleged and supported with evidence a claim that the 
mailbox, whether under the 1992 standard or the 2001 standard, was a defective product.1 
This is based upon a manufacturer's hornbook law duty to be responsible for defective 
products that cause injury, whether by defective design or manufacture. 
Niemela does not argue that this duty extends to recalling non-defective products, due 
to intervening advances in technology. See, e.g., Slisze v. Stanley-Bostich, 1999 UT 20,979 
P.2d 317. The change from a 3/4 inch knob to a 1 lA inch knob was not due to some 21st 
century advance in metallurgy. It did not make an already safe mailbox safer. It did make an 
unsafe mailbox safe for use by postal earners. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE "BROAD DISCRETION" TO 
IGNORE NIEMELA'S FIRST-HAND TESTIMONY ABOUT THE 
WAYS THAT THE 1992 SMALL KNOB MAILBOX WAS DEFECTIVE 
1
 The exact dates of purchase and/or installation of the mailboxes are not apparent from 
the record, making it impossible for the trial court to decide that the 2001 regulations were 
inapplicable. Niemela's testimony suggests that they were purchased prior to 2001 and installed 
as the subdivision was developed. 
-6-
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Imperial suggests that Niemela' s "opinions and allegations were rej ected by the Court 
within its broad discretion". Imperial Brief, p. 13. But Imperial waived that argument by 
failing to make a motion to strike Niemela's deposition or affidavit. Niemela was competent 
to give her own report of her experience with the mailboxes. Imperial fails to articulate why 
Niemela's personal experiences with the mailboxes were not admissible. It is not enough for 
Imperial to call her testimony "inadmissible subjective belief, when it is an actual account 
of her personal experiences. This is like saying that a driver's testimony that the light was red 
is just an "inadmissible subjective belief. Niemela's testimony does not purport to be a 
"belief, but is a factual account. Trial courts do not have "broad discretion" to reject first-
hand, relevant testimony, absent some other basis for objection. 
Imperial complains that Niemela lacked the "foundation or expertise necessary to 
opine on the design elements of the 1992 Model Mailbox, the standards within the industry, 
or the medical expertise to opine regarding causation." Imperial Brief, p. 18. Imperial 
mischaracterizes her testimony as expert opinion in order to disregard it. Niemela's statement 
that water got into the hinge and flange, and froze shut, preventing the door from "operating 
freely", was not expert opinion, but a factual statement. Her statement that she had to use a 
screwdriver to pry open the mailbox doors with more than 5 lbs of force is a factual 
statement, not an expert opinion. Her description that the mailbox door had "catch or binding 
points" is a factual statement. Her statement that the shallow depth door knob did not allow 
-7-
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"quick grasping" by her is a factual statement. Her complaint that the shallow depth door 
knob did not provide her with adequate "finger clearance and surface area [to] grasp" is a 
factual report of her personal experience. Her comparison of the shallow depth knobs and the 
larger, heavier and deeper knobs, provides a compelling basis for her to describe the 
problems with the earlier, smaller knobs. Her personal experience with the mailboxes gave 
her the necessary basis to describe the problems with how the mailboxes worked. 
Niemela never assumed she could testify as an expert about the "standards within the 
industry". She is relying upon the governmental standards in 1992 and 2001 to show that. 
Because there are governmental standards already set forth, expert testimony is not required 
to show what those standards would be. Her lay testimony is sufficient to show how the 
mailboxes deviated from the standards set by the government. Imperial also suggests that 
Niemela "submitted an affidavit that contradicted her deposition". Id. However, Imperial 
fails to explain what those contradictions are, and did not move to strike the deposition 
testimony or the affidavit from the record. 
Utah courts have allowed circumstantial evidence to prove product defect, without 
expert testimony. These cases were reviewed and followed in Taylor v. Cooper Tire & 
Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 1395 (10th Cir. 1997). Here there is abundant circumstantial evidence, 
in the form of Niemela's extensive experience with the two versions of Imperial mailbox. 
The issues are not complex. Anyone who has used a standard mailbox will understand. The 
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standards are already developed through governmental regulation. There is no reason to 
ignore this evidence in order to dismiss for failure to hire an expert witness. In fact, it is not 
even clear that an expert could add anything substantial to this specific case. 
The trial court erred by disregarding, in toto, Niemela's testimony and affidavit, and 
in dismissing her claims for failure to hire an expert witness. 
POINT FIVE 
IMPERIAL FAILS TO EXPLAIN WHY IT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO 
RAISE MEDICAL CAUSATION AS A NEW ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
Imperial threw into its Brief the argument that there was no medical causation. Id., p. 
14. Imperial did not submit any medical evidence to support an alternative theory of 
causation. Imperial did not depose any of Niemela's medical providers to explore their 
opinions. In fact, Imperial's motion for summary judgment does not mention medical 
causation at all, nor did its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment. As a result, 
Niemela did not respond to that issue, and the record is nearly silent on it. 
The appellate courts do not generally address arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal. In certain circumstances, if a legal ground is apparent on the face of the record, and 
there is no reason to believe that factual development would change the result, appellate 
courts do occasionally reach an issue to affirm. This is usually called affirming on any basis. 
But to do so here would be especially prejudicial, where the plaintiff has no opportunity to 
submit facts into the record on a challenged issue. This is not a legal issue but a factual one. 
-9-
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The record reflects that Niemela testified of a direct sequence of events, she pulled 
hard on a frozen mailbox knob, and she suddenly felt pain that never remitted. This is not a 
case where a plaintiff claims to have gotten cancer from a manufacturer's pollution of 
groundwater. This is like the plaintiff who trips and falls, breaking a wrist. The medical cause 
and effect was never really challenged by Imperial below and it is apparent even to a lay 
person. Such an argument should not be allowed to arise for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Niemela described in detail the specific ways that the Imperial mailboxes were 
defective. They had a knob that was too small around, too lightweight, and which had too 
little depth. They were poorly manufactured, with holes that allowed ice to form, freezing the 
mailbox doors shut. This evidence sufficed to create a genuine issue of material fact, whether 
the mailboxes were negligently designed, or negligently manufactured. That same evidence 
created a genuine issue of material fact whether the mailboxes were defective, and 
unreasonably dangerous to a consumer like Niemela, rebutting any presumption from prior 
compliance with regulation. This was not a situation where a manufacturer replaced one non-
defective product with another non-defective product. Niemela clearly explained how the 
design changes adopted in 2001 eliminated the problems with the prior design. The earlier 
Imperial mailboxes were unreasonably dangerous. Imperial should have stopped selling them 
by November 1,2000, at the very latest. It should have warned consumers to fix the ones that 
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were in the distribution chain, but not installed, to install the newer, larger knob. Imperial did 
nothing but pocket its profits. Summary judgment should be reversed. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 2011. 
BERTCH ROBSON ATTORNEYS 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Niemela 
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